why was the soviet afghan war called the soviets vietnam

Contrarily, other conceptions of power, proposed by Joseph Nye and Hannah Arendt, proved to be more relevant and useful in this situation. It will be argued that violent conceptions of power proved to be less useful for the achievement of the political objectives that were set out by the Soviets. This essay will illustrate how different conceptions of power played a role in the Soviet-Afghanistan war. Are these kind of strategies doomed to fail, or the key to success? An answer to this can be found in the analysis of the military campaign of the Soviet-Union in Afghanistan between 1979-1989. Other, more subtle concepts of power, are disregarded by stating that the USA will not participate in nation-building again. It is a strategy that relies on the assumption that the USA will derive power from the exercise of violence. The proposed approach of the USA under the Trump administration on the conflict in Afghanistan serves as another example, as the president stated that “ is not doing nation-building again … we are killing terrorists.” Apparently, Trump believed that the best way to exercise American power was to rely on military superiority, which would be used to eliminate insurgents. Saudi-Arabia’s aggressive counter-insurgency operations against the Houthis in Yemen are evidence of this paradigm in strategic thinking. What strategy allows states that are engaged in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations to counter this position of power? Practice shows that policy-makers seek to challenge the home-court advantage of insurgents with strategies that rely on the exercise of military power. This entails that insurgents operate on their own territory, consequently providing them with an advantage in terms of knowledge of the terrain, popular support, and access to resources in comparison to a foreign military force. Posen (2003) argues that insurgents have the capability to defy the balance-of-power vis-à-vis a more powerful actor due to their ‘home-court advantage’.

Military campaigns in Somalia (1992-1995), Yemen (2015-present), Afghanistan (1979-1989, 2001-present) and Vietnam (1965-1975) are harsh reminders for states that military superiority is no guarantee for a successful military campaign. Military interventions and counter-insurgency campaigns have proven to be a hard-to-tackle problem for powerful states in the 20th and 21st century.

Why was the soviet afghan war called the soviets vietnam